International Law -- Conflicting Jurisdictions by Robinson, K. G., Jr.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 46 | Number 3 Article 12
4-1-1968
International Law -- Conflicting Jurisdictions
K. G. Robinson Jr.
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina Law
Review by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
K. G. Robinson Jr., International Law -- Conflicting Jurisdictions, 46 N.C. L. Rev. 658 (1968).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol46/iss3/12
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
International Law-Conflicting Jurisdictions
The recent case involving Mehdi Eatessami, 1 an Iranian-born
Israeli citizen extradited from New York to Switzerland, points out
again, this time in the context of international extradition, the warn-
ing of the New York Court of Appeals2 that the "center of gravity"8
concept so important in choice of laws is not fungible with the con-
cept of "minimal contacts" for jurisdictional purposes.
Eatessami was accused by the Swiss of having masterminded
a loan swindle against the Swiss Bank Corporation. Accounti
opened with the main office of the Swiss Bank, in Geneva, were
filled with counterfeit stock certificates prepared and mailed from
New York. Subsequent loans totalling 300,000 dollars were se-
cured and the proceeds paid to Eatessami and his confederates
through New York banks.
In an earlier tort action brought in the New York state courts
for fraud,4 the question of jurisdiction under section 302 (a) (2) of
the New York procedure act had been determined. That section pro-
vides that New York courts may assert personal jurisdiction over a
nondomiciliary who "commits a tortious act within the state... ,5
and coincides with similar "long-arm" statutes enacted in other
states.6 In this pre-trial determination of jurisdiction, a finding
that the various fraudulent communications between Eatessami and
the Swiss Bank had been prepared and mailed in New York supplied
the necessary acts to support jurisdiction without violation of due
process. The court did not determine which law, Swiss or New
York, would apply in a trial on the issues. Generally, choice of laws
United States ex rel. Eatessami v. Morasco, 275 F. Supp. 492 (S.D.N.Y.
1967).
'Longines-Wittnauer Watch Co. v. Barnes & Reinecke, Inc., 15 N.Y.2d
443, 463, 209 N.E.2d 68, 80, 261 N.Y.S.2d 8, 23 (1965).
That jurisdiction would be the "center of gravity" whose law and pub-
lic policy is most concerned with the issues raised by the litigation. See
Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 254 (1958); Babcock v. Jackson, 12
N.Y.2d 473, 481-82, 191 N.E.2d 279, 283-84 (1963).
"Swiss Bank Corp. v. Eatessami, 26 App. Div. 2d 287, 273 N.Y.S.2d 955
(1966).
N.Y.R. Civ. PiAc. 302 (a) (2) (McKinney 1967).
"See, e.g., N.C. GEn. STAT. § 55-145 (1966). Compare Totero v. World
Telegram Corp., 41 Misc. 2d 594, 245 N.Y.S.2d 870 (Sup. Ct. 1963) with
Painter v. Home Fin. Co., 245 N.C. 576, 96 S.E.2d 731 (1957).
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teaches that the law of the place of the last occurrence necessary
to make the actor liable governs.7 However, determining whether
that last event is the receipt of the fraudulently obtained funds (New
York), or the making of the fraudulent representation (Geneva), is
unconnected with the question of jurisdiction. Under certain situa-
tions, New York may assert personal jurisdiction, yet be required to
apply the law of a sister state, or of a foreign nation.'
Yet little more than a year later, the Swiss government filed a
formal request9 for the extradition of Eatessami. Extradition, the
established method of recovery of the international fugitive,'0 is
governed in the United States by treaty" and federal statute,12 and
H. GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS 168 (1964).
' Cf. Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198 (1956); New York
Life Ins. Co. v. Dodge, 246 U.S. 357 (1918); Walton v. Arabian American
Oil Co., 233 F.2d Cir. 1956, cert. denied, 352 U.S. 872 (1956).
'A formal request for extradition requires authenticated documents sup-
porting the requesting state's contention that the surrender of the accused is
justified, including identification of the accused, a statement of the charges
with texts of the relevant laws, a warrant for arrest, depositions and related
evidence. Memorandum in opposition to writ of habeas corpus filed on behalf
of the Swiss government, Dkt. No. 67 Civil 3983 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
o See, e.g., Valentine v. United States ex rel. Neidecker, 299 U.S. 5
(1936). The actual proceedings differ, however, from normal probable cause
cause hearings. For example, 18 U.S.C. § 3190 (1964) permits the de-
manding country to introduce ex parte depositions gathered at home, but the
defendant may not do likewise. In re Oteiza y Cortes, 136 U.S. 330 (1890).
Nor can the accused introduce evidence which contradicts the demanding
country's proof, Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309 (1922); nor evidence to
establish an alibi, Desmond v. Eggers, 18 F.2d 503 (9th Cir. 1927); nor
evidence of insanity, Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447 (1913); nor evidence
that the statute of limitations has run, unless the treaty otherwise provides,
Merino v. United States Marshal, 326 F.2d 5 (9th Cir. 1963). Furthermore,
an American citizen may be held for extradition on deposition evidence which
would not be admissible at a preliminary hearing on a domestic crime.
Bingham v. Bradley, 241 U.S. 511, 517 (1916); Glucksman v. Henkel, 221
U.S. 508, 512 (1911) ; Wacker v. Bisson, 348 F.2d 602, 605 (5th Cir. 1965).
Indeed, "all the fictitious niceties of a criminal trial at common law" are ab-
sent. Gluckman v. Henkel, 221 U.S. 508, 512 (1911). See, Note 61 COL L.
REv. 105 (1961) ; cf. Evans, Acquisition of Custody Over the International
Offender-Alternatives to Extradition: A Survey of United States Practice,
[1964] BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 77.
"1 18 U.S.C. §§ 3181, 3184 (1964). Extradition can take place only in pur-
suance to a treaty. Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 287 (1933).
"See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3181-95 (1964). Interstate rendition is generally
controlled by the Uniform Extradition Act, now adopted by all states except
Alaska, Louisiana, Mississippi, Nevada, North Dakota, South Carolina, and
Washington. New York and Rhode Island adopted the Act, amending sec-
tion 6, so as to provide for "double-criminality," i.e., the offense must be
criminal in both states. N.Y. CODE CRIm. PROC. § 834 (McKinney 1967);
R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 12-9-8 (1956). See, e.g., People ex rel. Burtman
1968]
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committed solely to the federal government as an adjunct of the
treaty power.' 3 Usually, the jurisdiction of the requesting state
and that of the requested or asylum state over the accused is based
upon the principle of territoriality. 4 That is, the particular treaty
offense' 5 must have been committed within the territorial jurisdic-
tion of the requesting state, and the fugitive found within the
territory of the asylum state.' 6 Arguably, upon reviewing the finding
of the United States Commissioner that Switzerland had sufficient
basis for a claim to criminal jurisdiction over Eatessami, the federal
district court was obligated to take notice of the similar proceedings
of its New York counterpart. While full faith and credit does not
generally apply between federal and state courts beyond enforce-
v. Silberglitt, 15 Misc. 2d 847, 187 N.Y.S.2d 536 (Sup. Ct. 1956) (books
obscene in Pennsylvania not in New York); People ex rel. Albert v.
Commissioner of Correction, 111 N.Y.S.2d 307 (Sup. Ct. 1952) (gaming
tables illegal in Maryland are "games of skill" in New York).
"s U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2. While the executive has no inherent power to
extradite on its own initiative, Valentine v. United States cx rel. Niedecker,
299 U.S. 5 (1936), Congress does enjoy plenary power over aliens, Harisiades
v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 587 (1952), and the immigration law "bristles
with severities," Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 222 (1961). See also
United States ex rel. Feretic v. Shaughnessy, 211 F.2d 262, 264 (2d Cir.
1955); it re Gonzalez, 217 F. Supp. 717 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); United States
ex rel Paschalides v. District Comm'r, 143 F. Supp. 310, 312 (S.D.N.Y.
1956).
" See Berge, Criminat Jurisdiction and the Territorial Principle, 30
MicH. L. REV. 238 (1931). But see the criticism of the territorial principle
by Judge Frank in Walton v. Arabian American Oil Co., 233 F.2d 541, 543
& n.5 (2d Cir. 1956).
" Local law is used in defining the particular "treaty offense." See
Petitt v. Walshe, 194 U.S. 205, 207, 218 (1904); United States ex rel.
Rauch v. Stockinger, 269 F.2d 681 (2d Cir. 1959); In re Gonzales, 217 F.
Supp. 717 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
" The fugitive may have been in the asylum state when the crime was com-
mitted. United States v. Steinberg, 67 F.2d 77 (2d Cir. 1932), cert. denied,
287 U.S. 640 (1932); Wacker v. Beeson [sic], 256 F. Supp. 542 (E.D. La.
1966), aff'd, Wacker v. Bisson, 370 F.2d 552 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 387
U.S. 936 (1967). See also In re Harris, 170 Ohio St. 151, 163 N.E.2d 762,
10 Ohio Op. 2d 99 (1959) (non-support constitutes an "act" within thejurisdiction of the requesting state, for extradition purposes).
"' Here review of the commissioner's decision was through habeas corpus,
an alternative is an action for a declaratory judgment. Wacker v. Bisson,
348 F.2d 602, 606 (5th Cir. 1965). The scope of review, in any case, is the
same. Brownell v. Tom We Shung, 352 U.S. 180 (1956). The reviewing
court determines only whether the magistrate had jurisdiction, whether the
offense was within the treaty, and whether there is probable cause to believe
the accused guilty. Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309 (1922). The courts test
only the legality of the extradition proceedings; the wisdom of extradition
remains for the executive to decide. 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1964). See Note, 62
COL. L. REv. 1313, 1315 (1962); Note, 61 MicH. L. Rzv. 383, 387 (1962).
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ment of judgments,' 8 except in the taxation field,'" the Supreme
Court has been reluctant 20 to upset state court findings of jurisdic-
tion. Moreover, federal courts have followed state jurisdictional
laws in cases involving nondomiciliaries. 2 ' Furthermore, the deter-
mination of the state court that it had civil jurisdiction over Eates-
sami because of certain tortious acts done in New York, would im-
ply that it also had criminal jurisdiction,22 as those same acts were
criminal under New York statute.23 Ordinarily, the territorial
sovereign, being competent to prosecute for offenses committed
within its territory, would not extradite for such an offense.
24
However, without reference or mention of the New York court's
findings, the federal court found the extradition proceedings legal,
and following the approval of the Secretary of State, Eatessami was
extradited to Switzerland.25
Was the federal district court correct? First, it is important to
realize that it was concerned with treaty law.2" Familiar learning
teaches that treaties override state laws when a conflict arises. Be-
' Milwaukee County v. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268, 275 (1935). See
also 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1964).
10 Curry v. McCanless, 307 U.S. 357 (1939); Worcester County Co. v.
Riley, 302 U.S. 292, 299 (1937).
20 Except in extraordinary circumstances. Cf. Texas v. Florida, 306 U.S.
398, 342 (1939) (dissenting opinion of Frankfurter, J.).
1 United States v. Montreal Trust Co., 358 F.2d 239, 249 (2d Cir. 1966)
(concurring opinion); Arrowsmith v. United Press Int'l, 320 F.2d 219, 221
(2d Cir. 1963) (en banc).
22 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 1930(1) (McKinney 1967).
"3 N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 881(3), 884(5) (McKinney 1967).
' Evans, The New Extradition Treaties of the United States, 59 Am.
J. INT'L L. 351, 354 (1965).
" Extradition was approved by the Secretary of State on the charges of
obtaining money by false pretenses and the fraudulent use of counterfeited or
forged private instruments. However, the Secretary determined that the
record did not contain evidence that such instruments were counterfeited or
forged in Switzerland, and so refused extradition for the forgery charge.
Letter from the Secretary of State to the Swiss Ambassador, January 12,
1968. Eatessami was extradited on January 13, 1968 and will be tried under
Articles 148 and 251 of the Swiss Criminal Code, relating to embezzlement
and use of counterfeit securities. The Swiss statute provides for a maximum
sentence of five years imprisonment. Letter from Bernard J. Reverdin to the
writer February 23, 1968.
"
0Art. II § 4 of the Extradition Treaty Between the United States and
Switzerland of May 14, 1900, 31 Stat. 1928, 1929 (1900), T.S. No. 354
(effective February 28, 1901), provides:
Extradition shall be granted for . . . (4) The counterfeiting or forgery
of public or private instruments; the fraudulent use of counterfeited or
forged instruments.
Cf. Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U.S. 483 (1879), reVg, 69 Va. 62 (1877).
1968]
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yond reference to the applicable New York law for definition of the
elements of the relevant treaty offense, the state jurisdictional law
was not considered. Secondly, reference to New York state court
decisions would support the conclusion of the federal court that
indeed a crime, or at least punishable elements of a crime, had been
committed within the territory of the requesting state, in this case
Switzerland. In People v. Adams 7 New York courts convicted an
Ohio resident of the offense of obtaining money by false pretenses,
though the defendant was, at the time of the crime and for a while
thereafter, in Ohio, and did not come to New York until later.
Similarly, in People v. Zayas,2" the New York court held that it
had jurisdiction to try the defendant for a crime committed partially
in New York, where the false pretenses were made, and partially
in Pennsylvania, where the money was received. Thus, by New
York standards, culpable elements of the alleged crime had been
committed in Switzerland, though Eatessami had remained all the
while in New York.
Thirdly, the federal court apparently realized that the New York
court was not attempting to assert a preEmptive jurisdiction. Had
the New York court asserted exclusive jurisdiction based upon the
"center of gravity" concepts familiar to choice of laws, the question
might have been different. However, by merely determining that
it had jurisdiction because of certain "minimal contacts" with the
state, the New York court did not foreclose the assertion of a supple-
mental jurisdiction by another state,29 such as Switzerland. And,
as the federal court emphasized, any excessively complicated and
technical application of traditional jurisdictional concepts is ill-suited
to deal with the problems of multinational crime.80 Thus the federal
court was probably correct, and was able to insure the fulfillment of
national treaty obligations without offending federalistic guidelines.
K. G. ROBINSON, JR.
273 Denio (N.Y.) 190, aff'd 1 N.Y. 173 (1848).
-8217 N.Y. 78, 111 N.E. 465 (1916).
Cf. United States v. Arnhold & S. Bleichroeder, Inc., 96 F. Supp. 240
(S.D.N.Y. 1951); Eisler v. Soskin, 272 App. Div. 894, 71 N.Y.S.2d 682,
aff'd, 297 N.Y. 841, 78 N.E.2d 862 (1948).
"
0 See Re Vignoni, 17 Int'l L. Rep. 263, 264 (Chile, Sup. Ct. 1950).
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